I think the consensus needs to account for the volume and impact of the decision. It is not the same to pass a proposal with 20 votes that decides to spend 10AE than to pass a proposal with 20 votes that decides how to spend 40 million AE.
I am still really hurt from learning that my hard invested AE fund was done nothing by a few blocks of the incredibly high reward of 400 coins… and how it would be worth half by just 1 year because of inflation.
I was also baffled by how “in promptu” the launch of mainnet was, with no realy tools working yet. Literally at mainnet launch there was no explorer, baseapp didn’t really work, all SDKs were broken and not upgraded, airgap didn’t allow coins to be sent. That’s like getting a car and they telling you: “Here, your car is ready” while they hand you just the Engine.
And I really want the development to continue, I do. But you still have 40 million AE with centralized decisions, and propose a new decision on how to get more funds instead of using it to allow the community to decide how to spend the current funds already allocated? That seems really greedy.
I think this 0.1% - 20% is not needed right now, sure it will be needed in the future. But whatever percent of the remaining inflation curve? I won’t be surprised if the second vote is to normalize the mining reward… which in my personal opinion should have been done since day one. We really didn’t need to incentivize miners to mine.
And this why AE marketcap dropping against others.
Increase marketcap is the only way to make sure AE survive, and AE hurt it once. Now it is the second time.
Hurting token holders is the source of bad fame. That is why Initial token holders not recommend AE to others and why the community not strong.
I don’t think the announcement of the BRI vote has had any effect on market cap, especially in relation to other projects. aeternity has stayed around top 50 for weeks.
I am really really critical of teams out there either pretending that governance did not exist before Bitcoin or willfully and thus maliciously ignoring the huge body of knowledge that already exists about governance.
I am not an expert in governance, most of us aren’t. There are individuals in the wider crypto community who are and can advise. Why are they not being reached out to? That is actual ecosystem development - stretching out a hand to others in the same boat.
AE, from the very beginning of the clandestine launch, appears to be an ego-driven project. 1st impressions matter when attracting developers, users, miners etc pp - even if you have the best UX in the world. “Best blockchain in the world” , “historic vote”, “on-chain governance vote”.
If best practices in governance had been observed from before Genesis then a) we would not be in this predicament b) all the hyperbole in Aeternity’s PR would be unnecessary .
+++++++++++++++++++++++
AS others have proposed: I am in favor of a proposal system for the governance process, something which, to my knowledge, is neither in existence nor in the works, that is two-staged and OFF-CHAIN.
Votes should be on-chain but coming to an agreement what is to be voted on should, at this tage of AE development, happen off-chain. Agree ?
It is a tough internal conflict for the aembassadors also. Read on to learn why.
I daresay the age of shills, at least in the Global West, is over: knowledge about Blockchain in general is permeating society at a very high pace and advocating for a project that has easily verifiable flaws in its processes of how the community is governed (because that is what is happening now - we are being governed) is a tough position to be in.
Why? Because it puts aembassadors on the defensive when faced with the people it wants to attract the most. The people who really matter, the good and great developers, the people who care about disintermediation, ecosystem development, sustainable digital economies - they can quickly find out that AE as project has made rash decisions in the past with regard to the community.
And that will stop them from putting their lifetime behind this project (which I believe in because of the technology - and individual team members. The whole team dynamics are just…).
Longer voting period (I remember how GRC was doing this , the signalling periods were at least 2 weeks!)
BETTER BETTER BETTER announcements - please just OUTSOURCE your PR. You have the funds and it doesn’t cost much to boot.
–> In fact: the community could be used for this. Many solutions exist:
Bounty System (that is governed by a DAO-like structure)
Selected community members stake their AE in exchange for tasks. They fail to fulfill the task as determined via orcale -> slahing occurs.
There are many ways the community can be included in the development without setting dangerous governance precedents by binding on-chain votes.
I guess we need to talk about that more. I should get a laptop only for AEternity governance conversations on the forum - like the Surface Go - something that makes me want to do it more
Aeternity needs to take a responsibility of introducing hyperinflation without consulting it with community. If not this, the token price would be higher so their funds. Everything is at the expense of token holders. The Aeternity should have been started with very little inflation and PoW reward and then community should have been asked what level is right. Not the opossite!
Once the governance will be decentralized then BRI initiative can be on the table again, but now, after all ignorance and failed decisions, no.
Currently this is the situation:
PoW block reward: 364 AE (every 3 minutes)
AE price ~ $0.50
when BRI level:
1%: the fund will receive 53,180 AE ($26,590) per month
20%: the fund will receive 1,063,608 AE ($531,804) per month
Using the ATH price of AE token, on 20% BRI level, the BRI fund will receive $6,232,743 monthly. Do you guys think that the crypto-community will appreciate that? No, the crypto-community will be against that burden (as it is now due to hyperinflation), especially if BRI is centralized. AE marketcap will crash even more. The AE-team is acting like Aeternity is the only blockchain in the world. They don’t realize that they should create sound and competitive token-economics.
So on assumption that there will be 20% BRI level and based on that $6,232,743 monthly budget is not feasible, it means that AE price will never reach ATH again. The only winner will be people that drives the fund and divide money. Everything at the expense of token-holders. Who do you think will pay for that?
Please, don’t make a mistake, don’t be fooled again. Don’t believe that BRI fund will be decentralized as a DAO until it will be. If not, they will postpone it forever for their own interest. The AE-team have funds now and can propose and prepare decentralized BRI that can be later accepted.
You don’t think about token economics as a whole from the beginning. Aeternity team act like politics. Make a fire first (creating inflation, giving away money) and then heroically trying to save the economy.
You are telling now, hey, the inflation is too high, get tax those miners. We will spend that money better. Yay! Sure. But who will pay for that inflation and BRI which is part of it because it will be funded by percentage of PoW rewards?
If I tell that token-holders will pay for that it means they are already paying for that directly or indirectly. The fact that BRI doesn’t increase the AE issuance, doesn’t mean that the consequences won’t be paid by token-holders, because the price is relative.
The Aeternity-team decisions might not affect AE issuance, but they for sure affect AE token price.
And @vlad.chain. Do you think inflation is a burden? If yes, then the BRI is going to be part of it. Don’t be ignorant. Those two things, all the decisions should be considered equally (not separatelly). The inflation curve and BRI are introduced by Aeternity-team. You can’t say, BRI is not a burden, because it doesn’t affect inflation. So why that inflation was created? To legitimize BRI? At the end all the cost will be paid by token-holders.
Once the voting aepp is up and running (the general one), you will be able to propose a vote to reduce the inflation curve. As in the case of the BRI -> the miners will be the ones that approve/disapprove it.
Maybe. But the damage caused by it can’t be undone. The inflation curve is fading down anyway, but the AE created will resonate a long time. It was just throwing away money with no benefit (or even cost as it destroyed token-value). You could let the mining power grows organically and let the community decides how high PoW will be. And this is what might already destroyed AE as there are more competitive and responsible projects. It destroyed confidence of token-holders and the community already.
Just a few false promises so far are:
AE can be mined on mobile devices and mining will be decentralized (ASIC and GPU resistance). Now we have a mining cartel that controls more than 80% power enjoying high PoW reward.
AE will be governed by token-holders/community. Inflation curve wasn’t specified in a whitepaper so it should be designed and governed by investors and token-holders.
AE will be secured by PoW and PoS. So far AE is acting against stake-holders.
an online IDE for smart contract development and multiple tools for testing, including transaction debugger and a blockchain explorer
tools for developers , like ForgAE, Playground, and Goggles to setup development environment for smart contracts and æpps, from testing to deployment
a wallet and blockchain application browser — Base æpp — that supports the Ledger Nano S hardware wallet and AirGap cold-storage wallets focused on safety and mobile use
æternityBrowser Wællet Extension, allowing æpp creators and users to interact more efficiently, enabling mass adoption of decentralized æpps
just a few thoughts about governance votes that influence the protocol level
ok, so at the end the miners decide whether they will run the new software or not. there would be 3 different outcomes possible, right?
hardfork that splits the chain
all miners update their software
none of the miners updates the software
I would be interested in how the aeternity team would address these scenarios.
hardfork that results in 2 chains
would the team always support the chain that follows the governance vote?
all miners update their software
ok, easy usecase -> well done guys
none of the miners updates the software
does the team consider mechanisms like the UASF?
what if the update wouldn’t be possible without a hardfork?
generally it would be interesting to know which protocol-changes can be activated through a user activated soft fork and which changes would always result into a hardfork (if miners have different opinions).
